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WHOSE INDEPENDENCE? CABO VERDEAN-AMERICANS AND THE POLITICS OF 
NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF CABO VERDE (1972-1976) 
 
Abel Djassi Amado 






In this paper, I argue that anti-colonial politics in the late colonial period of Cape Verde 
had an important diasporic content. During the 1960s, Cabo Verde began a long, increasingly 
violent effort to attain independence from Portugal (finally achieved in 1975). Diasporic Cabo 
Verdeans in the US responded in surprisingly variable ways to the political resistance claiming 
their national homeland.  In this paper, I focus on responses by two political groups that emerged 
as central in the Cabo Verdean diaspora: the PAIGC-USA Support Committee and the Juridical 
Congress of World Cape Verdean Communities. I argue that these two groups constituted a 
political reification of important socio-ideological cleavages that emerged within the global Cabo 
Verdean community from the 1960s. The fall of Portugal’s fascist regime (Estado Novo) in 
1974, and the subsequent independence agreement with the African Party for the Independence 
of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde (PAIGC), crystalized these political differences. The zenith of 
intra-community, politico-ideological conflict corresponded to the Juridical Congress’ 
declaration of independence of Cabo Verde--in reaction to what many viewed as a grab for 
power by the PAIGC. In short, at a key moment in Cabo Verdean history, diasporic citizens 
exercised critical agency in seeking to influence, and even shape, the volatile political landscape 
in their homeland. 
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On December 18, 1974, the Government of Portugal and the African Party for the 
Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) signed what became known as the 
Lisbon Agreement, which initiated a process for Cabo Verde to achieve independence from 
Portugal seven months later (on July 5, 1975).  The independence agreement translated into the 
de jure political predominance of the PAIGC and the silencing of political forces that opposed 
the views of that liberation movement. By the end of 1974, the Union of the Peoples of the 
Islands of Cabo Verde (UPICV) and the Democratic Union of Cabo Verde (UDC)—the two 
parties that engaged in direct competition with the PAIGC during the second half of 1974—were 
simply wiped out of the political chessboard.1 In the months leading to the formal proclamation 
of the independence of Cabo Verde, the epicenter of opposition politic against the PAIGC shifted 
from Cabo Verde to Cabo Verdean communities abroad, chiefly in the United States.  
The PAIGC’s ascension to power on the islands crystalized the socio-political split 
among Cabo Verdean diaspora, with clearly discernible groups engaging in either a alliance 
politics or an opposition politics vis-à-vis the homeland.2 In the mid-1970s, two important 
political formations were the key actors in the politics of national independence of Cabo Verde 
among Cabo Verdean-Americans, namely the PAIGC USA-Support Committee and the Juridical 
Congress of World Cabo Verdean Communities. Apart from ideological differences, the 
leadership of these two political groups represented the socio-political fragmentation of the 
community in the late 1960s and 1970s. Cabo Verdean community was a fragmented community 
along the issues of social classes, racial and ethnic identity, and generation.   
In this paper, I want to advance three main points. First, Creole diasporas extend to their 
host country their homeland’s socio-identitary disputes and imaginings.3 That is to say, socially 
fragmented diasporic communities are likely to fashion diverse—if not mutually antagonistic—
political projects for their homeland. Second, diverse sections of the diasporic community 
develop distinct political projects. Third, organized factions of the diaspora resort to a myriad of 
political instruments and strategies to connect with foreign, international and transnational actors 
in order to legitimize and further entrench their own political views and perspectives.    
 
 
1 José André Leitão da Graça, Golpe de estado em Portugal: traída a descolonização de Cabo Verde! (Praia, Cabo 
Verde: Edição do Autor, 2004); José Vicente Lopes, Cabo Verde: os bastidores da independência (Praia: Spleen, 
2002).  
2 Michel S. Laguerre, Diaspora, Politics, and Globalization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 40.  
3 I use the term “Creole diaspora” in reference to the recent history of immigration of Creole peoples throughout the 
Atlantic World. Creole diaspora, as such, different-generations of peoples living and settling abroad from Cabo 
Verde, the key group under study, Jamaicans, and Haitians, to cite the best-known cases. In other words, the term 
applies to fragments of creole societies living abroad. Their creole condition, historically at the intersection of 
African and European civilizations, allow them to easily navigate in cultural landscape of Western world as well as 
to negate essentialized identity imposed onto them. Thus, for instance, both Cabo Verdeans and Haitians in the 
United States often reject their identity attachment to the African-American community. On this matter see, Marilyn 
Halter, Between race and ethnicity: Cape Verdean American immigrants, 1860-1965 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois 
Press, 1993); Regine O. Jackson, “The Uses of Diaspora among Haitians in Boston,” in Geographies of the Haitian 
Diaspora, ed. by Regine O. Jackson (New York and London: Routledge, 2011), 137. Though the term Creole 
diaspora might give the sense of a monolithic social experience shared by these creole societies, the reality is the 
opposite. Thus, one can find the cases of recent or modern diaspora (Cabo Verdeans) and incipient diaspora 
(Jamaicans and Haitians), if one uses the typology proposed by Gabriel Sheffer. For more on this, see Gabriel 
Sheffer, Diaspora politics: at home abroad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 75.   
38 
Theoretical Framework  
In a study of diaspora politics concerned with social behaviors and institutions created by 
diasporic citizens who aim to shape and alter political outcomes in their homeland, it is helpful to 
start by addressing the concept of diaspora. “Diaspora” is essentially a contradictory concept, as 
the term entails both dispersion and unity: it refers to the international spread of human 
communities that, at the same time, sustain a principle of symbolic or real unity through 
emphasizing common ancestry and national origin.4   Like any other sociological entity, 
diasporas are imagined communities.5 Political and social actors, chiefly those who command 
both cultural and material capital, may develop and disseminate a variety of narratives, 
discourses, and perspectives to explain and sustain the essence of that community. Diaspora 
communities imagine themselves in respect to their homeland, with which they maintain direct 
or symbolic relationships. In this regard, Michel Laguerre distinguishes between an “active” 
diaspora, whose members maintain actual ties to the homeland, and a “passive” diaspora, whose 
members develop only symbolic ties with the homeland.6 Within the same diasporic community, 
one may encounter sub-groups that maintain different kinds of ties and contacts (real or 
symbolic) with the homeland. In spite of the difference between these ties with the homeland, 
these different subgroups of a diaspora may remain engaged in a constructive discourse with 
their homeland—and among themselves.  
The term ‘diaspora,’ which derives etymologically from Greek (speiro = to sow, and dia 
= over) was initially applied to the Jewish social condition of historical dispersion from 
Palestine.7 Since the twentieth century, the term has been stretched to include the experiences of 
other national and ethnic groups dispersed in different countries. The concept of diaspora entails 
the notion of organic and substantial connection, real or imagined, with the homeland.8 
Homeland, like other forms of collective identity, is not static; different sections of homeland 
society often engage in a debate on what constitutes actual national identity. Dominant 
perspectives—and their challenges—on national identity migrate along with migrants. Diaspora 
views on the identity of the homeland structures and influences their political attitudes and 
actions towards their homeland.  
Diasporas, as argued by Paul T. Zeleza, are basically discourses, insofar as they form a 
catalog of narratives about self and homeland.9 Reaffirming their socio-identitary uniqueness 
within the context of the hostland entails the development of a discourse on the homeland. In 
such an endeavor of producing a narrative on the nation/homeland, diaspora groups 
symbiotically interact and clashes with views on the homeland produced by their fellow public 
intellectuals and activists both in the homeland and hostland.  The concept of nation may, 
 
4 On the notion of diaspora, see Eliezer Ben-Rafael, “Diaspora” Current Sociology 61, no. 5–6 (September 2013): 
842–61. doi:10.1177/0011392113480371. 
5  Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (London: Verso. 
2016). 
6 Michel S. Laguerre, Diasporic Citizenship: Haitian Americans in Transnational America (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1998), 8.  
7 Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora politics: at home abroad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 9; Milton J. 
Esman, “Diaspora and International Relations,” in Modern Diaspora in International Politics, ed. Gabriel Sheffer 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 333.  
8 Lisa Anteby-Yemini and William Berthomière, “Diaspora: A Look Back on a Concept” Bulletin Du Centre De 
Recherche Français À Jérusalem 16 (2005): 262-270. 
9 Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, 2005. “Rewriting the African diaspora: beyond the Black Atlantic,” African Affairs, 104, 
414 (2005): 35-68.  
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likewise, be considered a “tradition of argumentation,” as John Shotter has argued.10  As for the 
notion of the collective self, several different and contradictory perspectives prevail. And, as for 
the tradition of argumentation, like most other social and cultural products, that travels along 
with migrants and settles among diasporic communities. Dominant perspectives on collective 
social identity in the homeland are adopted and crystalized by those in the diaspora who maintain 
strong linkages with that homeland.  
In the enterprise of imagining a diasporic community, cultural and political entrepreneurs 
may interact and negotiate with a myriad of social groups and communities from at least three 
different geocultural spaces: the homeland; the mainstream sector of the host society; and 
marginalized groups of that host society.  Most obviously, both direct contacts and symbolic ties 
with the homeland inform how diasporic groups imagine themselves and their nation. Events in 
the past constrain and limits the choices in the present, creating, thus, a path dependence. Times 
of political crisis present opportunities to break political and social path dependence; as such, 
these moments may permit new visions of the nation to arise. Such altered conceptualizations of 
the homeland may result from a myriad of factors, ranging from social class, generation, direct or 
symbolic contact with the homeland, and contact with excluded groups of society, to assimilation 
into the mainstream community of the host nation. Diaspora politics connects both the homeland 
and the host country through formal organizations, which are basically political tools through 
which “‘diasporic politicians’ stress both the welfare of the community and their attachment to 
homeland affairs as an important incentive of their political participation in the hostland political 
process.”11 In other words, through community-based and/or broader political organizations, 
diasporans seek to influence political outcomes in the homeland.  Put differently, diasporic 
citizens engage in long-distance nationalism.  Ultimately, while living away from their 
homeland, diasporans’ strategic political engagements focus on producing particular political 
outcomes in that homeland.   
Despite the foregoing generalizations, it is important to emphasize that diasporas are not 
monolithic socio-political entity.  Although their members derive from the same homeland and 
often share a combination of values and symbols, ranging from language and culture to other 
critical social elements, diasporic communities are fragmented; different social cleavages, such 
as social classes, generation, and even region from the homeland whence groups come, tend to 
create fractures; often, these divisions become politicized.  
In contemporary times, diasporic citizens typically develop a myriad of organizations and 
networks, through which they base their cultural and political activities.12 These organizations 
constitute significant political tools, conferring a number of advantages to their members, 
ranging from the pooling of resources to being a mark of political modernity.  These diasporic 
political organizations have three audiences in mind. First, they engage in internal 
communication, as they seek to represent what they perceive to be the view of the community 
they belong. In a way, these organizations tend to see themselves as a microcosmic 
representation of their community. Second, they seek to engage with the host country’s 
government and/or its political leadership. As they are rarely able to shape policies through 
electoral politics or conventional political participation, given their numerically size, diasporans 
 
10 John Shotter, Cultural politics of everyday life: social constructionism, rhetoric and knowing of the third kind 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993).  
11 Laguerre, Diaspora, Politics, and Globalization, 3-4.  
12 Ben Rafael, “Diaspora,” 843.  
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often resort to a strategy of ethnic lobbying as the vehicle through which they might influence 
policies. Beyond these local efforts, the last audience of these organizations is the homeland.    
Diasporic communities engage in a dynamic process of imaging the nation. As diasporas 
are not sociologically monolithic, their different segments advance different—and sometimes 
contradictory—interpretations of the nation. When a given narrative of the nation becomes 
dominant, sections of the diaspora that do not endorse such an interpretation mobilize many 
types of resources—human, material, and symbolic—to disseminate a counter-narrative, 
designed to undermine and subvert the perceived dominant narrative about the nation. Through 
political organizations and actions, including ethnic lobbying before different levels of the host 
nation’s government, different components of the diaspora will seek to influence the debate on 
the nation and its political future.  
 
  
On the Cabo Verdean Diaspora in the United States  
Although the literature on the Cabo Verdean diaspora is quite rich and robust, studies on 
the Cabo Verdean diaspora and/or immigration tend to be carried out almost exclusively by 
anthropologists, historians, and demographers. 13 These studies tend to emphasize the cultural 
aspects of the diaspora and/or to trace the history of its origin and development.  Few studies yet 
exist on Cabo Verdean diaspora politics: perhaps because few political scientists have written on 
the relations between Cabo Verde and its diaspora, scant attention have been to the role that the 
latter has played in defining and shaping politics in the former.   
The historical process of diasporization of Cabo Verdean people developed in relation to 
distant geographies, namely the Portuguese colonial empire (of which the islands were a 
constituent part until their independence in 1975), along with the wider Atlantic world. Colonial 
policies, coupled with harsh natural and climatic conditions, compelled Cabo Verdeans to seek 
life alternatives elsewhere. From the mid-nineteenth century, the Portuguese colonies of São 
Tome and Principe, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau were the main destinations to Cabo Verdean 
migration. Since the late nineteenth century, and particularly during the early twentieth century, 
thousands of Cabo Verdeans migrated to other destinations, such as Brazil, Argentina, the United 
States, Senegal, and, later, other Western European states such as France, Italy, United Kingdom, 
and the Netherlands.14  
Almost a century ago, Albert Jenks wrote that in cataloguing the history of immigration 
to the United States, the history of Cabo Verdeans constituted its “curious chapter.”15 In fact, the 
presence of Cabo Verdeans in the United States has been traced back to the late 1600s or early 
1700s, beginning with the trans-Atlantic whaling industry.16  However, mass migration of Cabo 
Verdeans to the United States expanded significantly in the late nineteenth century, peaking in 
 
13 Luís Batalha and Jørgen Carling, ed., Transnational archipelago perspectives on Cape Verdean migration and 
diaspora (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2008); Deirdre Meintel, “Cape Verdean Transnationalism, Old 
and New,” Anthropologica 44, 1 (2002): 25-42; Halter, Between race and ethnicity; G.S. Gibau, “Diasporic Identity 
Formation among Cape Verdeans in Boston,” The Western Journal of Black Studies, 29, 2 (2005): 532-539; Laura J. 
Pires-Hester, “The Emergence of Bilateral Diaspora Ethnicity Among Cape Verdean-Americans,” in The African 
Diaspora: African Origins and New World Identities, ed. Isidore Okpewho, Carole Boyce Davies, and Ali A. 
Mazrui (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 485-503.  António Carreira, The people of the Cape 
Verde Islands: exploitation and emigration, trans. Christopher Fyfe (London: C. Hurst, 1982) 
14 Carreira, The people of the Cape Verde Islands; Batalha and Carling, Transnational archipelago. 
15 Albert Jenks quoted in Halter, Between race and ethnicity, 1.  
16 Carreira, The People of the Cape Verdean Islands.  
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the 1910s and 1920s. As Deidre Meintel has pointed out, the late nineteenth century and the first 
quarter of the last century constituted a period of intensive transnationalism, with some twenty 
thousand Cabo Verdeans entering the US in the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
alone.17   
Cabo Verdeans were probably the first Africans to voluntarily mass-migrate to the United 
States. In fact, the notion of voluntary migration to the US has been a dominant trope among 
Cabo Verdeans and Cabo Verdean-Americans, often presented as a sign of collective 
distinctiveness and source of pride.18 Migration to the United States has occupied a central place 
in the group’s collective subconscious, and many public intellectuals have connected the Cabo 
Verdean diaspora with the socio-economic and cultural advancement of Cabo Verdeans more 
generally.  
For a variety of reasons, migration from Cabo Verde to the United States declined 
significantly from the 1920s onwards. New immigration policies in the United States during the 
late 1910s and early 1920s made it difficult for the islanders to move to the United States. The 
period from the 1920s to the 1960s corresponds to what Deidre Meintel calls “the retreat of Cabo 
Verdean transnationalism.”19 During this period, contacts with the homeland became scarce and 
the Cabo Verdean community in the New England turned into itself. The few contacts that 
existed were carried out mostly through trans-Atlantic trade via packet ships. As historic 
homeland, Cabo Verde became a symbolic entity, a distant place whence the ancestors came.   
By the 1960s, the key sites of presence of Cabo Verdeans in the United States were 
southern Massachusetts and Rhode Island.  Towns and cities such as New Bedford, Wareham, 
and Boston (in Massachusetts), and Providence and Pawtucket (in Rhode Island), became hubs 
of Cabo Verdean communities in the United States. While excluded by the mainstream Anglo-
Saxon society as well as the local Portuguese communities, most Cabo Verdean immigrant 
communities in New England also rejected any type of identification with African-Americans. 
“Creole” social identity was carefully deployed as a tool to distinguish them from African 
Americans. Identity labels such as “Bravas,” “Black Portuguese,” and later “Cape Verdean,” 
were devices deployed to highlight social differences and distance between the immigrants of 
Cabo Verde and African-Americans—in spite of the fact that many among Cabo Verdeans 
shared phenotypic characteristics with African Americans.20  
Second- and third-generation Cabo Verdean-Americans were more attuned to the civil 
rights movement of the U.S., and the overall political environment and discourses of the 
1950s/60s. The quest for equality and de facto citizenship resonated with many Cabo Verdeans, 
who experienced similar socio-economic and political plights to those of African-Americans. 
The context of the civil rights movement and the development of the more radical Black Power 
movement greatly shaped political behaviors and attitudes of young Cabo Verdeans. The social 
atmosphere of the civil rights movement and more radical Black activism of the late 1960s and 
early ‘70s influenced young Cabo Verdean-Americans in two main ways. First, at the level of 
identity politics, many began to accept and even proudly display Blackness. Second, the political 
 
17 Meintel, “Cape Verdean Transnationalism,” 31-33; Halter, Between race and ethnicity, 38; 41. 
18 Halter, Between race and ethnicity; Raymond Anthony Almeida, Cape Verdeans in America: Our Story. (Boston: 
The American Committee for Cape Verde, Inc. 1978).  
19 Meintel, “Cape Verdean Transnationalism.”  
20 Halter, Between race and ethnicity; Gina Elizabeth Sanchez, Diasporic [trans]formations: race, culture and the 
politics of Cape Verdean identity, Unpublished PhD Dissertation (Austin: University of Texas at Austin, 1999), 83; 
Sidney M. Greenfield, “In Search of Social Identity: Strategies of Ethnic Identity Management Amongst Cape 
Verdeans in Southeastern Massachusetts,” Luso-Brazilian Review 13, 1 (1976): 10. 
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atmosphere in the United States of the 1960s contributed to ethnic revival among a variety of 
ethnic groups that make up the social fabric of the country. Like other groups, Cabo Verdean-
Americans began to imagine Cabo Verdean-ness—now named, Caboverdeanidade—as a 
condition of their singularity.21 
In the decades following the end of the Second World War through the 1960s, political 
engagement among different segments of the Cabo Verdean community in New England 
oscillated between a politics of acquiescence and a more contentious politics. As anticolonial 
armed struggle erupted in the former Portuguese colonial empire in Africa, the Portuguese 
regime developed a sophisticated and well-orchestrated public diplomacy designed to conquer 
the hearts and minds of Americans, Portuguese-Americans, and Cabo Verdean-Americans.22 In 
the senior generation of Cabo Verdeans, the Portuguese government found valuable allies to 
disseminate a message promoting unity of the empire. In the late 1960s, as an indication of the 
ideology of a pluricontinental and pluri-racial Portuguese Nation, the Portuguese government 
invited Belmira Nunes Miranda, Attorney Roy Teixeira Sr., and Judge George Leighton—three 
well-known and respected members of the Cabo Verdean community in the United States—for a 
tour of two key spaces in the empire, Angola and Mozambique. These personalities became 
interlocuteurs valables for the empire and used their social and symbolic capital to disseminate a 
message emphasizing the unity of the Portuguese nation—hence, arguing against 
independence—across its colonial empire. For instance, Belmira Nunes Miranda, the only 
woman who accompanied the group, wrote for several months for the local community 
newspaper, The Cape Verdean, reporting on the wonders of the empire.  
By contrast, the next generation imported and adapted to social strategies, discourses, and 
organizations developed in the context of the civil rights movement. In fact, many young Cabo 
Verdeans joined and even led some radical Black American organizations. For instance, Salah 
Matteos, a second-generation Cabo Verdean-American, became involved with the organization 
led by Malcolm X in the first half of the 1960s and, through that organization, became aware of 
the ongoing armed struggles for independence in Africa.23 Frank “Parky” Grace, a second-
generation Cabo Verdean-American, led the Black Panther Party chapter in the city of New 
Bedford, Massachusetts.24  
Manuel T. Neves, the founder and editor of The Cape Verdean, indicated his annoyance 
over, and displeasure with, the fact that many young Cabo Verdean-Americans had adopted the 
language and symbols of Black Power movement.25 Yet, civil rights and Black Power 
movements were one of the main avenues through which Cabo Verdean ethnic and diaspora 
 
21 Marlyn Halter, “Cape Verdeans in the U.S.” in Transnational Archipelago. Perspectives on Cape Verdean 
Migration and Diaspora, ed. Luís Batalha and Jørgen Carling (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1008), 35-
46. 
22 Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black liberation: The United States and white Africa, 1948-1968 (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1985), 74; Vasco Ribeiro, “Lobistas, assessores de imprensa e relações-públicas norte-
americanos que serviram o Estado Novo (1942-1974),” Media & Jornalismo 19, 35 (2019): 56.  
23 Personal Communication with Sallah Matteos, November 5, 2019. 
24 Jama Lazerow, “A Rebel All His Life”: The Unexpected Story of Frank “Parky” Grace, in In search of the Black 
Panther Party: new perspectives on a revolutionary movement, ed. Jama Lazerow and Yohuru R. Williams 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 104-157. 
25 Manuel T. Neves, “Power Struggle among Cape Verdeans in New Bedford,” The Cape Verdean, May 1969, 1; 
See also the letter to the editor by the Portuguese Consul, Jorge de B.A. Freitas, “Letter to the Editor,” The Cape 
Verdean, January 1971.  
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politics developed.26 For its part, the Portuguese government’s official position was to limit, if 
not completely nullify, the political influences of the Black Power movement among Cabo 
Verdean-Americans. In a letter to the editor that he published in The Cape Verdean in 1971, the 
Portuguese General Consul (Jorge de B. A. Freitas) argued that “Black Power is the movement 
of Black Americans—and Cabo Verdeans are Luso-Americans.”27 
In short, the presence of Cabo Verdeans in the United States has a long history. In the 
United States, Cabo Verdeans have come to understand that their ideas about race, informed by 
the Portuguese racial ideology, did not match those prevalent in the United States, where the 
dominant racial ideology is that of a binary (white v. non-white), significantly distinct from the 
idea of racial continuum practiced in Portuguese empire. Older generations of Cabo Verdeans 
tended to cling to this racial ideology and rejected any type of identification with African-
Americans. By the 1950s and ‘60s, the new generation of Cabo Verdean-Americans, born and 
raised in the United States, began to accept and adopt their blackness.   
 
 
Diaspora Politics of National Independence: Organizations, Actors, and Ideologies  
In the months following the April 1974 Carnation Revolution in Lisbon, which brought 
an end to the 41-year right-wing dictatorship called the Estado Novo, a vibrant and heated 
political debate about the nation ensued among Cabo Verdeans both at home and in the United 
States. Several socio-political groups were formed, each advocating for a different understanding 
of what would constitute the Cabo Verdean nation and its destiny, in light of the ongoing process 
of decolonization of the Portuguese colonial empire. The idea of diaspora leads to the 
assumption of it being a monolithic social entity, when in reality it is rather a diverse and eclectic 
collection of groups, with each holding its own understandings and imaginings—sometimes, 
internally contradictory—of the homeland, its culture, its future, and its destiny. As argued by 
Cape Verdean-American anthropologist G. S. Gibau, Cabo Verdeans in the US are fragmented, 
characterized by identity conflict.28 By the late 1960s and early ‘70s, Cabo Verdean-Americans’ 
social differences produced a strikingly diverse set of perspectives on the essence and future of 
the homeland. These diverse perspectives manifested themselves through the formation of two 
main political groups: the PAIGC-USA Support Committee, and the Juridical Congress of World 
Cape Verdean Communities.  
Founded in the late 1950s, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and 
Cabo Verde (PAIGC) was a political organization made up of Cabo Verdeans and Guinean-
Bissauans engaged jointly in the politics of national liberation of their two then-Portuguese 
colonies in West Africa. In the early 1960s, as it became clear that Portugal resisted dismantling 
its colonial empire peacefully, the PAIGC developed an intense political campaign to mobilize 
Cabo Verdeans and Guineans both at home and abroad.   
The idea of establishing a cell and/or a support committee of the PAIGC in the United 
States dates back to the beginning of the armed struggle for national liberation. In the early 
1960s, the leadership of the PAIGC began to cultivate relationships with Cabo Verdeans residing 
in the United States. A small number of Cabo Verdeans in the United States, who met regularly 
to discuss the prospects of Cabo Verdean independence in light of the ongoing decolonization in 
 
26 Salahudin Matteos, “The Cape Verdeans and the PAIGC Struggle for National Liberation: An Interview with 
Salahudin Omowale Matteos,” Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, vol 3, 3 (1973): 43-48. 
27 Jorge de B. A. Freitas, “Letter to the Editor,” The Cape Verdean, January 1971.  
28 Gibau, “Diasporic Identity Formation.” 
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Africa, contacted the headquarters of the PAIGC in December 1961.29 A few months later, the 
party appointed Pedro Pires, then the leader of the PAIGC bureau in Dakar, Senegal, as the 
contact person with the Cabo Verdean diaspora in the United States.30 From 1961-63, there were 
regular exchange of letters and other forms of communication between the PAIGC and members 
of the Cabo Verdean diaspora in the United States.31 In 1962, during a visit to the United States, 
the leader  of the PAIGC, Amilcar Cabral, met with Cabo Verdeans and proposed a political 
organization called the Associacão Hesperitana to serve as an auxiliary member of the movement 
he led.32 However, this effort did not result in any concrete political linkage.   
Ten years later, a small group of young Cabo Verdean-Americans, led by Salah Matteos, 
founded the PAIGC-USA Support Committee. Like many of his companions, Matteos, had 
political training in the context of the U.S. civil rights movement, and through his active 
participation in the radical struggle for dignity and equality of African-Americans. As Amilcar 
Cabral himself recognized early, the struggles of African-Americans and colonized Africans 
have long been connected.33 Through his early engagement in the former, Matteos became aware 
of the struggles for African liberation. In 1972, Matteos travelled to West Africa to join the 
liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau. The PAIGC leadership advised him to return to the USA 
and form a support committee. That idea had support from Cabral, who, in his last visit to the 
United States, argued for the necessity to create a PAIGC Support Committee. 
The PAIGC USA-Support Committee was an organization independent from the party’s 
political structures: the members of the support committee did not constitute party cadres or 
members. Rather, they were essentially committed sympathizers to the party’s ideology and 
cause. In the history of the PAIGC, there were other support committee created that aggregated 
immigrant communities (e.g., the support committee in Côte d’Ivoire in 1963).34 The Support 
Committee purported to function like a transmission belt between the party leadership and the 
diaspora community. The main task of the organization was to engage in campaigns of 
mobilization and information, so as to instill political awareness among Cabo Verdean 
Americans of the ongoing struggle for national liberation that was taking place in Guinea-
Bissau.35 In late 1973, the PAIGC-USA Support Committee began to publish No Pintcha 
(Bissau-Guinean Creole for “let’s move”), a newspaper that served as a vehicle to disseminate 
news from the PAIGC, updates on the ongoing liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau and Cabo 
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Verde, and political news from the community in the United States.  No Pintcha was a trilingual 
newspaper featuring articles, opinions and other pieces in Cabo Verdean Creole, Portuguese and 
English. No Pintcha ultimately became a forum for the promotion of the political ideals of the 
PAIGC, chiefly that of national independence and the political unity between Cabo Verde and 
Guinea-Bissau.   
Additionally, the Support Committee was instrumental in mobilizing resources, both 
symbolic and material, from different sections of mainstream American society. For instance, 
Salah Matteos, the chair of Mobilization and Organization Section of the PAIGC-USA Support 
Committee, led a campaign before the United Church of Christ (UCC) in May 1974; that 
convention which took place in Hyannis, Massachusetts, resulted in the UCC recognizing the 
Republic of Guinea-Bissau as an independent nation.36  Beyond this explicitly political goal, the 
support organization’s work also addressed other key issues, ranging from education and social 
awareness, demonstrations and rallies against Portuguese interests, to contacts with other 
organizations in the United States.  
Furthermore, the PAIGC-USA Support Committee was socially and politically integrated 
in ethnic politics and coalition-building. Leaders of the committee were either members of and/or 
worked closely with III Pyramids, Inc., a multi-ethnic coalition of non-governmental 
organization founded by Cabo Verdeans, African-Americans, and Native Americans in 1969. 
The PAIGC USA-Support Committee also engaged in coalition- building with other mainstream 
progressive groups. Its leader, Salah Matteos toured US universities to campaign on behalf of the 
PAIGC struggle in Africa. Taking advantage of its connection with other progressive 
organizations, in 1973 the PAIGC USA-Support Committee secured a substantial grant 
($18,000.00) from the Episcopal Church, through its General Convention Special Program.37 In 
the first half of the 1970s, the PAIGC-USA Support Committee was instrumental in creating one 
of the most durable myth abouts Cabo Verdeans in the USA, namely that the size of the 
community was about 300,000.38  
Just as the PAIGC gained momentum and seemed unstoppable in its quest to gain power 
in Cabo Verde, in early 1975, a new political organization was created by Cabo Verdean-
Americans: the Juridical Congress of World Cape Verdean Communities. Two socio-political 
factors explain the dynamic process that led to the formation of this second group: the December 
18 Agreement between the Government of Portugal and the PAIGC, and a trip by a Cabo Verde-
born Portuguese diplomat (Aguinaldo Veiga) to the United States.   
The December 18 Agreement, which marked the fall of the Portuguese dictatorship, was 
itself linked to the anti-colonial war in Guinea-Bissau, coordinated by the PAIGC. In August 
1974, Portugal recognized Guinea as an independent nation.  Following this development, 
Portugal and the PAIGC began to discuss possible modalities for Cabo Verde to, likewise, 
achieve independence. On December 18, 1974, Portugal and the PAIGC reached a political 
agreement in Lisbon. While the Lisbon Agreement did not translate into a direct transfer of 
power from Portugal to the PAIGC, it was, nonetheless, a significant political victory for the 
party, insofar as other Cabo Verdean political parties, such as the Union of the Independent 
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Peoples of Cabo Verde (UPICV) and the Democratic Union of Cabo Verde (UDC), had not 
made it to the independence talks. A new government of transition was appointed by the 
independence agreement, and it included representatives appointed by the PAIGC.    
Many Cabo Verdeans, both at home and in diaspora, distrusted the PAIGC. The 
somewhat radical political line of the party included a number of principles that alienated many 
Cabo Verdeans. First and foremost, the PAIGC meant an ideological rupture with how the social 
identity of Cabo Verde had been constructed by the nation’s literati since the early 1900s. A 
dominant trope shared by the islands’ writers and poets was the assumption that Cabo Verde was 
fundamentally linked to the culture and civilization of Europe in general, and Portuguese in 
particular. Baltazar Lopes da Silva, the epitome of the generation of writers that became known 
as the “Claridosos,” writes of Cabo Verde as a “romance experience in the tropics.”39 Against 
this Western-based interpretation of Cabo Verdean social identity, Amilcar Cabral, the leader of 
the PAIGC, suggested what he termed “African regionalism.” In this model, the people of Cabo 
Verde were culturally African. Such an identity statement had political implications, as it 
removed Cabo Verde from the sphere of Western influence and instead made a case for it to be 
included in the concert of African states. Another central principle of the PAIGC—which 
constituted, at the same time, a key political objective—centered on the political unification 
between Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau. In fact, this idea had been codified in major documents 
of the party since its inception in the late 1950s and early ‘60s.40   
Beyond this specific goal, the PAIGC espoused a leftist, radical political ideology that 
included elements of Marxist thought. During the liberation struggle, the PAIGC developed 
strong linkages with the Communist states, which provided valuable material, diplomatic and 
political support.41 Portugal was a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a 
military alliance that included most of the Western European and North American States. As 
such direct support for the nascent state seeking independence from Portugal was never 
forthcoming from the Western states. Indeed, to the Portuguese regime, the PAIGC was no more 
than a puppet organization in the service of international communism—the Soviet bloc.  
The independence agreement with the PAIGC meant the victory of a particular 
interpretation of Cabo Verdean identity. Many Cabo Verdeans saw the PAIGC as a catalog of 
things that they despised and/or rejected, ranging from pan-Africanism and political unity with 
Guinea-Bissau to international Communism and anti-liberal democracy. Many believed that 
Guinea-Bissau would eventually join the ranks of   communist regimes; for this reason, the fear 
of a communist takeover in Cabo Verde was another main reason that many Cape Verdeans 
rejected the idea of political unification with Guinea-Bissau. Especially for Cabo Verdean elites 
living in the diaspora, the PAIGC was basically a stooge of Soviet imperialism, and they worried 
that independence with PAIGC in charge of the new government would translate into a 
Communist regime taking hold on the islands.  
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A further factor concerned global diplomatic relations.  At a time that the Cold War was 
entering into its post-détente phase, Cape Verdean opponents of the PAIGC hoped the anti-
Communist argument could have helped win political support from the US government. In fact, 
according to XX, the official line of the US government in 1975 was that “we don’t want a base 
[in Cabo Verde], but we don’t want the Russians to have it either.”42 It was against these 
perceptions that the Juridical Congress was eventually formed by a small number of conservative 
Cabo Verdean lawyers living in the  United States.  
A second major factor that drove the founding of the Juridical Congress was the arrival of 
the Portuguese diplomat, Aguinaldo Veiga, in the United States.  Born in Cabo Verde, Veiga 
made his career in the Portuguese imperial bureaucracy. In 1961, he was part of the Portuguese 
diplomatic delegation to the United Nations. During a visit to the United States in 1961, Veiga 
met some elites of the Cabo Verdean diaspora living in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.43 
Following the crumbling of the dictatorship in Portugal, in October 1974, Veiga published a 
short book about the politics of independence in Cabo Verde.44 The book was a rejoinder to the 
PAIGC ideological line, criticizing those who argued for “total and immediate independence” for 
Cabo Verde, whom he called “impatient Cabo Verdeans.”45 Furthermore, Veiga bitterly 
criticized the idea of a post-colonial unification between Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau--a 
project he considered contradictory, as it would lead to “independence in dependence,” as he 
characterized this model.46  
By the end of 1974, with the independence agreement reached, national debate changed 
from whether or not to seek independence, to what kind of national independence to embrace. 
Like many other political actors who were initially opposed to the idea of national independence, 
Veiga, began to focus on ways to preempt the PAIGC-led quest for independence from 
establishing a new government. Already, the PAIGC seemed to have an almost unstoppable 
momentum in its dynamic process of occupying the seat of power in Cabo Verde.  To challenge 
that momentum, in December 1974, Veiga moved to the United States with a mission to swing 
the Cabo Verdean-American communities away from supporting that seeming likelihood.  Veiga 
decided to move to the United States because of the size and relative prestige  he believed the 
Cabo Verdean community in the United States had. For him, the Cabo Verdean community in 
North America was large and powerful enough “to speak up for the natives in the islands.”47 
 
 
The Juridical Congress Unilateral Declaration of Independence   
In early February 1975, Aguinaldo Veiga met with Roy Teixeira, Belmira Nunes Lopes, 
Joseph Andrade and Ben Goncalves met in Sacramento, CA.  There, the group discussed the idea 
of creating a new association.48 They decided to form an organization named the Juridical 
Congress of World Cape Verdean Communities. The name was carefully chosen to reflect two 
predominant characteristics of the organization. On the one hand, the leadership of the 
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movement rested in the hands of lawyers. On the other hand, the organization aimed to attract 
representatives of Cabo Verdean diasporas from around the world.  
On February 22 and 23, the Juridical Congress held a conference at the Sheraton Hotel in 
Boston. The conference was led by five lawyers, aided by an advisory body of twenty people 
(seventeen men and three women). Reports indicate that over 2,500 people attended the 
meeting—it was, to date, the largest event ever held of Cabo Verdeans in the United States.49 
The meeting produced a “Resolution” that consisted of ten different points, which can be 
organized under the rubric of five different themes: (a) a declaration of “total and immediate 
independence” from Portugal (I); (b) the illegality and unconstitutionality of the prior 
Independence Agreement reached between Portugal and the PAIGC  (II and III); (c) the denial of 
Portuguese sovereignty, and the claim that if Portugal maintained armed forces stationed in Cabo 
Verde, that would constitute an “invasionary force” (IV and V); (d) an assertion that both the 
PAIGC and Guinea-Bissau were enemies of the people of Cabo Verde, hence the transitional 
government in Cabo Verde was illegitimate (VI-VIII); and (e) the predominance of the attorneys 
within this political organization (IX-X). 
The conference centered on three main topics: first, legal deconstruction of the Lisbon 
Agreement, signed on December 18, 1974; second, the resolution of a motion calling for the 
independence of Cabo Verde; and, finally, the organization of a government-in-exile.  The 
conference centered on the legal deconstruction of the independence agreement with the 
members of the congress arguing but ultimately approving, a motion that declared the 
Independence Agreement between the Government of Portugal and the PAIGC legally void. This 
argument was based on the notion that one of the contracting parties in the agreement, the 
PAIGC, lacked legitimacy and mandate from the people of Cabo Verde. The final resolution 
stated that the PAIGC was “a foreign political group that never was elected, chosen, or accepted 
by the Cape Verdian [sic] people.”50 For the Juridical Congress, the PAIGC was a foreign 
political organization originating and based in Guinea-Bissau. The notion of the PAIGC being a 
foreign body was something previously defended by Veiga, weeks before the meeting. In an 
open letter to the United Nations, Veiga had protested the PAIGC’s foreign activities in Cabo 
Verde.51 In fact, the Resolution of the Juridical Congress classified the PAIGC as “an 
invasionary force and an enemy of the People of Cabo Verde.”52 
Following the legal nullification of the Lisbon Agreement, the Juridical Congress voted 
to “proclaim and herewith effectively declare the total and immediate independence of the 
archipelago of the Cape Verde.”53 The Juridical Congress’s unilateral declaration of 
independence, though without any real political implications for Cabo Verde, was part of a 
strategy of preempting the PAIGC’s  political takeover and subsequent redefinition of the nation.   
Lastly, the Resolution of the meeting called for the establishment of a government-in-
exile that would seek recognition from friendly states around the world. The Congress granted 
the “jurist doctors, Roy J. Teixeira, Antonio J. Cardozo, Roy J. Teixeira, Jr., Harry I. Fernandes, 
 
49 “Cape Verde’s fate argued in Hub,” The Boston Globe, February 23, 1975, 30; Luis V. Overbea, “Cape Verdeans 
eye control of Homeland,” The Christian Science Monitor reproduced in The Cape Verdean, March 1975, 2.  
50 “Congress of Capeverdian [sic] Communities,” The Cape Verdean, March 1975, 8; Aguinaldo Veiga, “Open 
Letter to Committee on Decolonization of the UN,” The Cape Verdean, April 1975, 1-2.  
51 “Reactionary Cape Verdeans Plan Action in US,” Southern Africa Vol VIII, no 3 (March 1975): 25.  
52 “With 2,600 Delegates Cheering, the Juridical Congress Passed the following Resolutions on February 22 and 
23,” The Cape Verdean, April 1975, 1 (italics added) 
53 “To the Cape Verdeans of the World,” The Cape Verdean, April 1975, 6.   
49 
and Aguinaldo Veiga” the mandate to speak on behalf of Cabo Verde and its people.54 As a 
visual representation meant to powerfully symbolize the constitution of a new government in 
absentia, the Juridical Congress also approved a new symbol of the state—a flag—which was 
then blessed by a Cape Verdean Catholic priest present at the conference (Reverend Father 
Benvindo Leitao). 
Beyond these instrumental political goals, the Juridical Congress aimed to fundamentally 
define the socio-political identity of Cabo Verdeans both at home and abroad. Against the Pan-
Africanist views on the identity of Cabo Verdeans, which was gaining traction in the 1970s, the 
movement sought to return to the Eurocentric approach to Cabo Verdeanness. This attempt was 
hardly uncontroversial.  In fact, many Cabo Verdean-Americans saw the meeting as an 
unwelcome attempt to strengthen a Eurocentric emphasis of Cabo Verdean identity. Yvonne 
Smart is one participant who disagreed with the platform. At the meeting, she perceived a basic 
identity conflict between a “Eurocentric” and “Afrocentric” emphasis. As a Cabo Verdean-
American associated with the Black Empowerment movement of the time, Smart and others 
attending the meeting, rejected the Juridical Congress leaders’ views. Smart described her 
group’s emphasis quite simply: “we were Afro-centric.”55  
 The meeting did not go unnoticed by the PAIGC-USA Support Committee. On the first 
day of the meeting, the group brought some one hundred bodies, who protested outside the 
Sheraton Hotel on a cold, winter day. The protest included speeches by the leaders of the 
organization, including Salah Matteos. The PAIGC-USA Support Committee also issued a 
written statement that classified the meeting as an attempt of diasporic elites to safeguard their 
material interests, as well as to sow confusion and division within the Cabo Verdean 
community.56 
In the following months, as the process for independence began to take shape in the 
homeland, both groups of Cabo Verdean-Americans devised a number of different political 
strategies to either strengthen or weaken the position of the PAIGC in Cabo Verde. Part of the 
strategy followed by the Juridical Congress included ethnic lobbying before members of federal 
legislative and executive bodies. Thus, in April 1975, Aguinaldo Veiga and Roy Teixeira, Jr., 
traveled to Washington, D.C., where they met with representatives from several congressional 
offices from New England states, California and Florida.57  
Meanwhile, in Boston, the two groups focused their attention on winning support from 
local representatives of the Cabo Verdean diaspora. In order to better learn about the situation, 
Senator Edward Brooke called for a meeting with the representatives of the two organizations 
and other stakeholders on April 18, 1975, in his office in the JFK Building. During the meeting, 
Brooke mentioned that the U.S. Congress had appropriated some five million dollars to Cabo 
Verde. The representatives from the Juridical Congress responded by suggesting that the 
distribution of the aid be trusted to an impartial agency such as the Red Cross. For their part, the 
PAIGC-USA Support Committee wanted to learn about the official position of the U.S. 
government vis-à-vis independence, but Senator Brooke did not provide much information. 
Overall, the meeting was a political defeat for the Juridical Congress insofar as their strategy of 
linking the PAIGC to the Soviet Union failed miserably. The idea that the PAIGC-Lisbon 
Agreement was an indication of its satellite status vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was rejected by 
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Senator Brooke, who mentioned that even the U.S. government had its own agreements with the 
Soviet Union.58  
At this point, the first post-independence election was approaching. In this politically 
momentous climate, the strategy of the Juridical Congress shifted toward more toward 
international law. The leaders’ idea was to take their case before an international court.59 Veiga 
argued that the upcoming election in Cabo Verde had no legitimacy, and that the independence 
of Cabo Verde had to be confirmed in the Hague.60  
The Juridical Congress had both a negationist and a constitutive agenda. On the one hand, 
it negated the legality, legitimacy and constitutionality of the independence agreement between 
Portugal and the PAIGC. Through its resolutions and speeches by its leaders, it became clear that 
the group’s objective was to seek the nullification of that independence agreement in an 
international court. On the other hand, the Boston conference supposedly invested a new 
sovereign state, with a government in exile and the sorts of key political symbols, such as a flag 
and a coat of arms, that are expected as part of modern statehood.61 
After the formal independence of Cabo Verde, the Juridical Congress managed to 
maintain its political activity for another year or so. By the end of 1975, however, many 
members grew disappointed with the Juridical Congress. In a penetrating editorial in December 
1975, Manuel Neves, whose reporting in the early months of that year. Had clearly been biased 
in favor of that organization, condemned the Juridical Congress, noting that “nothing has been 
accomplished.”62 The organization became dysfunctional, with mismanagement of funds and 
distrust eventually leading to its political insignificance and eventual dissolution.   
In fact, by the end of 1976, both the organizations I have been discussing here had 
vanished from the diasporic political scene--though for opposite reasons.  The PAIGC-USA 
Support Committee disappeared because it had fulfilled its mission.  By contrast, the Juridical 
Congress disappeared because it was unable to generate support for its members’ quest to 
challenge the PAIGC’s leadership in achieving independence and statehood of Cabo Verde. By 
the late 1970s, few members of the Juridical Congress maintained their opposition to the post-
colonial regime in Cabo Verde.  They maintained an engagement in opposition politics by 
joining forces with other dissenters, leading to the formation of another association, the Cabo 




Independence politics in the homeland have an effect among diasporic citizens.  In the 
modern world, those citizens may use a myriad of strategies and institutions to shape political 
outcomes in their homeland. Among Cabo Verdeans in the United States, two main political 
organizations were formed at a critical moment in the homeland’s political life. The PAIGC-
USA Support Committee was restricted to the diasporic sites of southern New England (New 
Bedford and Boston areas) and maintained mostly symbolic connections with the homeland, as 
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its leaders were born in the United States and had no direct contacts with Cabo Verde. By 
contrast, the Juridical Congress was a coalition of Cabo Verdean elites from more dispersed 
diasporic sites ranging from New England to California—though it never attracted diasporic 
communities from beyond the US.   
At the sociological level, the leadership of these two political organizations represented 
two distinct social categories of Cabo Verdeans in the United States. The PAIGC-USA Support 
Committee was led by young, high-school-dropout, second-generation Cabo Verdean-Americans 
who had close links with African-Americans and their struggle for social equality. The PAIGC-
USA Support Committee adopted ideological stances of Pan-Africanism and imagined Cabo-
Verdeanness in relation to blackness and Africanity. For its part, the leadership of the Juridical 
Congress consisted of highly educated Cabo Verdean-Americans, many of whom were born in 
Cabo Verde (Aguinaldo Veiga, Roy Teixeira) and had material interests in the islands (Roy 
Teixeira). The Juridical Congress maintained the traditional colonial discourse of Cabo Verde as 
a mestizo, “creole” society in which the vestiges of African culture have long been diluted, as 
argued by the Cabo Verdean intellectual, Baltazar Lopes da Silva.63 This group was convinced 
that focusing on cultural and/or political connections to Africa would be tantamount to 
committing cultural genocide of the Cabo Verdean people.  
Unexpectedly, these dramatically opposed ideological and social distinctions translated 
into divergent political projects for the homeland. For the older generation associated with the 
Juridical Congress, political independence represented. By contrast, for the young generation 
affiliated with the PAIGC-USA Support Committee, political independence under the aegis of 
the PAIGC represented a political victory of an African people against European colonialism.   
The intense debate and campaigns regarding the political independence of Cabo Verde 
served to stir the community in the search of its self. Several other community organizations 
were created, or old ones became redesigned, to focus on claiming the uniqueness of Cabo 
Verdean identity. These organizations engaged mainstream political institutions with the goal of 
altering the perception towards the community as well as to give the community a voice in how 
it is perceived. For instance, through the work of the Cape Verdean Educators Collaborative, the 
Cape Verdean language became recognized as a ‘living foreign language,’ and thus a medium 
for bilingual education.64 Similarly, the laborious lobbying and political activities conducted by 
the Cape Verdean Veterans Association of New Bedford ultimately resulted in the census of 
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